Federal Court Rules Websites Are Not Places of Public Accommodation Under the ADA

On February 9, 2026, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri dismissed an accessibility lawsuit filed under Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) against restaurant operator Baileys' In Midtown, Inc. (operating as Rooster), finding that commercial websites are not "places of public accommodation" under the statute.

Even though the defendant failed to respond to the summons and the clerk entered a default, the court denied the plaintiff's motion for a final default judgment and dismissed the complaint on the merits in favor of the defendant.

Background of the Dispute

The plaintiff, a blind resident of Hamilton, Missouri, relies on screen reader software to browse the internet. According to the complaint, he attempted to access Rooster's website on January 20, March 7, and June 23, 2025, to browse menu offerings with the intention of purchasing items online or visiting the company's principal place of business at 3150 South Grand Boulevard in St. Louis.

The plaintiff identified several accessibility barriers under the Web Content Accessibility Guidelines (WCAG), including an inability to expand menu items using a keyboard and improperly defined menu bar roles. He notified the business through counsel prior to the June 2025 attempt. When the issues remained unaddressed, he filed suit on August 12, 2025.

After service was completed on August 21, 2025, the restaurant failed to file a responsive pleading within 21 days, prompting the court clerk to enter a default.

Plain Language and the Definition of "Place"

In reviewing whether the uncontested allegations stated an actionable legal claim under Rule 55(b)(2), the court focused on Title III requirements. Noting a lack of direct precedent from the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, the judge examined the statutory text of 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7).

The court determined that every entity categorized as a public accommodation under the statute constitutes a physical location. Applying dictionary definitions, the judge concluded that the word "place" requires a physical environment or space. Consequently, websites are not places of public accommodation under the plain text of Title III.

Rejection of the "Nexus" Test

The plaintiff argued that a sufficient "physical nexus" existed between the website and the physical restaurant locations. While noting that the Third, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits have recognized claims where online barriers impede access to goods at physical stores, the court deemed the nexus approach extra-textual and unpersuasive, citing instead the textual analysis in the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Gil v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc.

The court also observed that recent Department of Justice regulations adopting WCAG standards apply solely to public entities under Title II, rather than private commercial accommodations under Title III. Because the plaintiff conceded the website merely mirrored the physical restaurant offerings and did not allege any physical barrier preventing him from visiting the brick-and-mortar restaurant, the court found no violation of 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a).

Denial of Attorney's Fees

Having concluded that the plaintiff failed to state a valid claim, the court refused injunctive relief and denied the plaintiff's request for attorney's fees. The judge added that even if a default judgment had been granted, recent case law precludes treating non-merits default judgments as establishing "prevailing party" status necessary for fee awards under 42 U.S.C. § 12205.

The full ruling is available via GovInfo.